Welcome to my Homepage! Since August 2019, I have been an Assistant Professor of Economics at Ashoka University, India. My primary research interest is in theoretical microeconomics - models of asymmetric information. I also do empirical work relating to social networks and issues in development economics. I graduated from the doctoral program in Economics at The Pennsylvania State University.
Publications
Signalling, Reputation and Spinoffs (Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, May 2018, Volume 149, 88-105) PDF Internet Appendix
I propose a new channel of spinoff (firm formed when an employee leaves to set up his own firm) formation in which the returns from spinning off are determined endogenously. If high ability workers are scarce, then despite the principal's ability to offer contracts (endogenous cost of signalling), there exists a separating equilibrium where the high type worker signals his ability by forming a spinoff. This result provides theoretical support to the empirical findings of Skogstrom (2012). When moral hazard is introduced in the baseline model of adverse selection, I show that the spinoff equilibrium can generate the strongest incentives to work. This has policy implications for non-compete clauses.
Ethnic Conflicts with Informed Agents: A Cheap Talk Game with Multiple Audiences and Private Signals (Economics Letters, Volume 184, November 2019) PDF Internet Appendix
with Pathikrit Basu and Souvik Dutta
We consider a society on the brink of ethnic conflict due to misinformation. An ‘informed agent’ is a player who has information which may prevent conflict. Can the informed agent achieve peace by communicating privately with the players? The issue is that if the informed agent is known to favour her own ethnicity, she is unable to communicate credibly with the other ethnicity. Despite this, we show that peace can be achieved in equilibrium. Our paper contributes to the literature on cheap talk games with multiple audiences with the novel addition of private signals along with payoff externalities.
Adviser Connectedness and Placement Outcomes in the Economics Job Market (Labour Economics, Volume 84, October 2023, 102397) PDF Internet Appendix
with Michael Rose
We study the role of social networks in the academic job market for graduate students of Economics. We find that the connectedness of a student's advisor in the coauthor network significantly improves her job market outcome. We use two identification strategies and find that a) higher Eigenvector centrality of an adviser leads to her student getting placed at a better ranked institution, and b) larger distance between an adviser and an institution decreases the probability that her students are placed there. Our study sheds light on the importance of social connections in a labour market where information frictions regarding job openings are virtually absent.
Working Papers
The Impact of a Spinoff on the Parent Firm: A Model of Double Adverse Selection with Correlated Types PDF
A principal and her worker's type is correlated via the principal's screening ability (a high ability principal is more likely to hire a high ability worker). The firm's stage payoff depends upon the worker's reputation. This paper provides a new explanation for how a spinoff (firm formed when a worker leaves to set up her own firm) can be beneficial for the parent firm. The key idea is that in any market with sufficiently high worker attrition, a firm's future payoff depends crucially on the belief about the principal's ability to recruit good workers repeatedly. I show that spinoffs are more likely to be formed by high ability workers. Due to the correlation in types, this result implies that spinoff formation can provide a positive signal about the principal's type. I further show that there exists an equilibrium which explains a previously unexplained empirical finding - spinoff formation can hurt the parent firm in the short run, but be beneficial over a longer run. My results have policy implications for non-compete covenants.
Cheap talk with multiple senders and receivers: Information transmission in ethnic conflicts PDF
with Satyam Rai
We model a society with two ethnic groups in which the state of the world is uncertain. Without new information, ethnic conflict is inevitable. If there is an informed agent who knows the state of the world and can communicate via private cheap talk messages, can she prevent conflict? We find that while a peace-loving informed agent is unable to prevent conflict as she cannot communicate credibly with either ethnicity, a more aggressive informed agent can communicate information to her own ethnicity, and therefore prevent conflict with positive probability. Furthermore, we show that if each ethnicity has their own informed agent, then both ethnic groups receive information but, under some conditions, there is an informative equilibrium in the environment with one informed agent which generates a higher probability of peace than any informative equilibrium with two informed agents.
Communicating Bias PDF
with Srijita Ghosh and Swagata Bhattacharjee
We consider a static cheap talk model in an environment with either one or two experts whose biases are privately known by the experts themselves. Before the experts learn the state, they send a cheap talk message about their bias to the decision maker. Subsequently, the decision maker chooses one expert to get state relevant advice from. We ask two questions - One, is there an equilibrium where the experts' bias is fully revealed? Two, is the bias revealing equilibrium welfare improving for the decision maker? We find that when there is only one expert, there is no bias revealing equilibrium. However, if there are two experts, there exists a bias revealing equilibrium, and under some conditions it gives the decision maker more utility than any equilibrium which is possible without bias revelation. This highlights a new channel through which sender competition can benefit the decision maker.
Work in Progress
Moral Hazard in Regulations with Loopholes (with Co Pierre Georg)
En-bloc voting of unrepresented groups (with Sabyasachi Das and Advaita Singh)
On the backburner
What's in a Name? Reputation and Monitoring in the Audit Market PDF Internet Appendix
with Somdutta Basu
Teaching
Mathematics for Economics (Undergraduate level)
Ashoka University, Spring 2020, 2021, 2023
Asymmetric Information Models (Masters level)
Ashoka University, Fall 2019, 2020, 2021, Spring 2023, Spring 2024
Economics of Information (Undergraduate level)
Ashoka University, Fall 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, Spring 2024
Econometrics (Masters level)
University of Cape Town, 2018
Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis and Policy (Undergraduate level)
The Pennsylvania State University, 2015
Curriculum Vitae
Download CV as PDF
Contact
821, AC04 Building
Ashoka University
Rajiv Gandhi Education City
Sonipat, Haryana 131029
India